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LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW 
The following is a complete list of all the parties in the proceedings before the 
Fourth District Court, State of Utah, Utah County, Orem Department: 
The Honorable John C. Backhand, Judge, Presiding. 
The City of Orem, Plaintiff, represented by Michael G. Barker. 
Defendant, Trindalynn Olson, represented by Gregory V. Stewart. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement allows police to enter an 
unattended, unlocked vehicle parked in a public parking lot to retrieve property which is 
in plain view and has been identified as having been stolen? 
In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to the district court regarding 
the application of law to underlying factual findings. State v. Alvarez, 206 UT 61, 147 
P.3d425. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, nut upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953, as amended). Theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405 (1953, as amended). Receiving stolen property, 
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acts constituting. 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, or 
who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Tryndalynn Olson, (hereinafter "defendant") was cited by Officer 
Wallace of the Orem Department of Public Safety for two counts each of Theft and 
Possession of Stolen Property on September 8, 2005. R. 1. She was subsequently 
charged by criminal information with the same charges. R. 2. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on December 16, 2005. R. 33. 
The court heard testimony on defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence on January 24, 
2006. R. 41. The parties were allowed to submit memoranda arguing the facts and law. 
R. 40. Appellee, the City of Orem, (hereinafter "the City") filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Suppress on April 13, 2006. R. 48. The court issued a Ruling 
On Motion To Suppress on April 20, 2006 in which it denied defendant's motion and 
ordered the City to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the 
City's memorandum. R. 50. The City submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on August 2, 2006. R. 55. The court signed an order denying defendant's motion on 
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August 7, 2006. R. 57. 
The parties subsequently filed a Conditional Plea Agreement in which the City 
agreed to dismiss one count of Theft and one count of Possession of Stolen Property. 
Defendant retained the right to appeal the court's denial of her Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. R. 73. Defendant entered her pleas pursuant to the Conditional Plea 
Agreement on December 7, 2006. R.80. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on January 
5, 2007. R. 84. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At approximately 1:23 p.m. on September 8, 2005, three police officers 
from the Orem Department of Public Safety were dispatched to Famous Footwear at 292 
West University Parkway in Orem, Utah. R. 28. They went there to investigate a 
shoplifting report. R. 89:13. Two were in uniform and one was in plainclothes. R. 
89:17. Two drove marked police cars and the other drove an unmarked Crown Victoria. 
R. 89:17. They all parked within two or three stalls of a car later identified as 
defendant's. R. 89:17, 18. 
2. Bonnie Smith ("Smith") was the assistant sales manager at Famous 
Footwear. R. 89:3. She was familiar with the store's inventory control system and was 
able to track inventory and sales on the store's computer system. R. 89:3, 4. 
3. Smith was working alone at the time this incident occurred. R. 89:4. 
Defendant was in the store looking at shoes. R. 89:4. Smith's attention was drawn to 
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defendant because defendant was carrying two large bags and was making a mess as she 
looked at several pairs of shoes in the rear of the store. R. 89:5. Also, defendant was in 
the back part of the store in an area in which people will try to shoplift. R. 89:5. The 
store is equipped with bubble-type convex mirrors that assist store personnel to see the 
back part of the store. R. 89:5. 
4. Smith offered to help defendant put away any shoes she wasn't interested in 
buying. R. 89:5. Defendant declined and walked away holding a box containing a pair of 
white and fuchsia K-Swiss running shoes. R. 89:6. The K-Swiss model in the box was a 
new model in the store and had not been sold before. R.89:8. Defendant went around the 
corner of a display. R. 89:6. Smith could still see defendant in a convex mirror mounted 
on the wall. R. 89:6. 
5. Smith saw defendant put the box back on a shelf and then exit the store. R. 
89:7. As defendant left the store without purchasing any merchandise, Smith noticed 
defendant's bags appeared bulkier than they had been when she entered the store. R. 16, 
R 89:19. Smith watched defendant go out to a car parked in front of the business and put 
the bags inside. R. 89:7. Smith checked the box defendant placed on the shelf and 
noticed it was empty. R. 89:6, 7. Smith did not pursue or otherwise confront defendant 
because Smith was the sole employee in the store at the time. R. 89:10. 
6. Smith took the empty box to the front of the store. R. 89:8. Another 
employee entered the store and asked Smith whether she had sold a pair of the new K-
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Swiss shoes? R. 89:8. Smith replied she hadn't. The other employee went out and 
looked in defendant's car and saw a pair of the new-model K-Swiss shoes matching the 
model missing from the empty box now in Smith's possession. R. 89:8, 12. Smith later 
identified the shoes when shown them by an officer. R. 89:9. 
7. Smith called the police to report the theft. R. 89:8. While waiting for the 
police to arrive, she checked the store's inventory system to determine whether a pair of 
K-Swiss shoes matching those in defendant's car had previously been sold. Smith 
determined that the shoes in the car should still be in inventory. R. 89:8. 
8. Lt. Giles ("Giles") arrived at the scene at approximately 1:37 p.m. R. 28, R. 
89:30. He spoke with Smith and the other store employee. R. 89:14. The employees 
told him what they had seen - how the defendant entered the store, looked at shoes, 
declined assistance from Smith, left the store with her bag looking bulkier than it had 
been when she entered the store, how Smith found the empty K-Swiss box and checked 
inventory to see if that model had been sold, how the defendant put her bag in a car 
parked outside the store, how the second store employee verified the same shoes that 
should have been in the empty box were in the defendant's car. R. 89:19, 20. Giles then 
went out to defendant's car and saw in plain view visible through any of the car's 
windows the pair of K-Swiss shoes described by Smith and the other employee. R. 89:14, 
23, 24. The car was parked in front of the store. It was unlocked and the keys were in the 
ignition. R. 89:14. Wallace also saw the shoes in plain view from his vantage point 
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outside the car. R. 89:37-39. 
9. Giles ran the car's license information in an attempt to find a phone number 
to call the registered owner. R. 89:14. He located a phone number but was unable to 
reach the registered owner. R. 89:15. 
10. While Giles was attempting to locate a phone number for the registered 
owner, Office Gabe Santistevan ("Santistevan") went into businesses adjacent to Famous 
Footwear trying to locate a person matching the suspect's description. R. 89:15. He was 
unable to find anyone matching the suspect's description. 
11. After approximately forty-five minutes of trying to find defendant and/or 
contact the registered owner of the car containing the shoes, Giles determined officers 
needed to enter the car and seize the shoes rather than spend an indeterminate amount of 
time waiting for defendant to return. R. 89:16, 17. Giles and Wallace retrieved the stolen 
K-Swiss shoes and an empty K-Swiss box that did not match the shoes seized. R. 89:18, 
21, 33. After seizing the shoes, Giles took the car keys and locked the door because there 
was no responsible party present to ensure the security of the car. R. 89:26, 27. 
12. Giles left the scene, leaving Wallace in charge of the rest of the 
investigation. R. 89:21, 32, Wallace took a written statement from Smith. R.16, R. 
89:32. While Smith was filling out a written statement, defendant returned to her car. R. 
89:32, 33, 38. Wallace issued her a citation. R. 1. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is fundamental to our system of government that an officer must obtain a warrant 
before conducting any search or seizure of property. U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. "[Cjapacity to claim the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded 
place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
143 (1978). 
The United States Supreme Court has stated " . . . searches and seizures conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject to only a few specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions. Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366, 372 
(1993). Courts have carved out careful exceptions to the general rule. "We. . .have made 
it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special law 
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, 
the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a 
warrantless search or seizure reasonable." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 
(2001). Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the plain view, abandonment, and 
automobile exceptions. See e ^ Dickerson at 375; Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217, 241 
(1960); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). 
Defendant removed shoes from Famous Footwear without paying for them. She 
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then placed the stolen shoes in her car, which was unlocked, and parked in a public 
parking lot, in view of anyone passing by her car. Under the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement listed above, defendant's actions obviated the need for the police to obtain a 
warrant to seize the stolen shoes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INCRIMINATING ITEMS IN PLAIN VIEW MAY BE SEIZED WITHOUT 
A WARRANT. 
The plain view doctrine is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment. See Dickerson. In Dickerson the Court stated that "[i]f police 
are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is 
immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they 
may seize it without a warrant. Id at 375. The Court reasoned that a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband left in open view and thus there has been 
no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment independent of the initial 
intrusion by officers. Id. at 375. 
In order to establish that a warrantless search complies with the plain view 
doctrine, an officer must meet three criteria. First, the seizing officer must be lawfully 
present and able to view the item without violating the Fourth Amendment. Second, the 
item must be in plain view. Third, the incriminating nature of the item must be apparent. 
See State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 976 (UT App. 1998); State v. GrossL 2003 UT App 
181,72P.3d686. 
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Applying the facts in this case, it is clear that the plain view doctrine is applicable. 
Defendant has conceded that officers met the first two prongs of the test. Appellant's 
Brief at 11, 12. First, the officers were lawfully present and able to view the shoes 
without violating the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's car was parked in a public parking 
lot in a busy retail area. R. 89:7 Anyone passing by her car would have been able to see 
inside and view the contents of the passenger compartment. Second, the item was in 
plain view. Although testimony differed as to the exact location of the shoes within 
defendant's car, three people were able to see the shoes in plain view - the unidentified 
store clerk, Lt. Giles and Officer Wallace. R. 89:8, 12, 14, 23, 31. 
At issue is whether officers met the third prong of the test. The City contends the 
incriminating nature of the item in plain view was apparent. An item is clearly 
incriminating if the officer has probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity. 
See State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Utah Supreme Court 
has defined what constitutes "probable cause": 
"Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires 
that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or . . . useful as 
evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be 
correct or more likely true than false." State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, 
f7, 141 P.3d 602 citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
The item itself need not be inherently identifiable as contraband. "The presence of 
commonplace items that would not arouse suspicion in a lay person may support probable 
cause for a law enforcement officer when, in light of the circumstances and based on his 
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experience and training, the items reasonably indicate a relation to illegal activity." 
Griffith at \1. 
Giles and Wallace did not need a warrant to enter defendant's car because they had 
probable cause that the shoes they could see in the car were associated with criminal 
activity. Giles, and to a lesser extent Wallace, had spoken with two witnesses employed 
by Famous Footwear who provided details linking the shoes with a crime. R. 89:14. 
Giles had learned that Smith had specifically seen defendant in the store in the area 
of the store where the shoes were displayed for sale and that was also subject to 
shoplifting activity. R. 89:19, 20. Smith saw defendant exit the store holding a bag that 
appeared bulkier than it had been when Smith first encountered defendant. Id Smith saw 
defendant place her bags in the car. Smith found an empty box that had contained shoes 
of the same make and model at which defendant had been looking. Id Smith determined 
that the particular model of K-Swiss shoes defendant looked at was missing from 
inventory. Id The second store employee saw the shoes in defendant's car. Id All this 
information evidencing a crime and the location of the stolen shoes was relayed to Giles 
and Wallace. 
Subsequently, when Giles and Wallace were standing in a lawful position from 
which they could see the shoes matching the description given by the store employees, 
they properly entered defendant's car and seized the shoes. They did not need a warrant 
to do so. 
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II. DEFENDANT ABANDONED HER PRIVACY EXPECTATION 
REGARDING PROPERTY IN HER VEHICLE BY LEAVING 
STOLEN PROPERTY IN HER UNLOCKED CAR IN A PUBLIC 
PLACE. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the abandonment exception to the 
warrant requirement. In State v. Rynhart 2005 UT 84, 125 P.3d 938, the court 
considered a case where a Brigham City police officer discovered a single-vehicle 
accident in which a van was parked in the middle of a private field. Based on evidence at 
the scene, the officer deduced the accident had occurred a few hours earlier. In an 
attempt to locate the owner of the van, the officer looked inside a purse left in the van. 
He discovered a baggie containing a small quantity of cocaine. Defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence. The trial court upheld the search under the emergency aid 
doctrine. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed stating neither the emergency aid doctrine 
nor the abandonment doctrine applied. The Utah Supreme Court reversed stating the 
abandonment doctrine applied. 
At the outset of its opinion the court stated there is a distinction between 
abandonment in a property-law sense and abandonment in a constitutional sense. Id at 
H14. A property law analysis asks whether a person has abandoned her right to possess 
the property. Id Conversely, abandonment in a constitutional sense occurs when a 
person relinquishes her reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. Id at ]f 15. 
Thus, the issue in an abandonment case is not whether the defendant abandoned the right 
to possess the property in question (i.e the van or the purse) but whether the defendant 
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voluntarily abandoned her legitimate expectation of privacy in the items. Id at \21. "A 
property owner need not intend to permanently relinquish ownership or possession to 
forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy; she need only leave an item unsecured in a 
public place." kLat1J2l. See also California v. Greenwood 486 U.S. 35.40 (1988) 
(concluding that putting your garbage out at the curb exposes it to public scrutiny); United 
States v. Barlow. 17 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1994) ("A defendant has abandoned his 
reasonable expectation of privacy when he leaves an item in a public place."). For the 
City to prevail it must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant voluntarily 
abandoned any legitimate privacy interest in the place to be searched. Rynhart at 1J21. 
In this case, defendant voluntarily placed stolen shoes in her unlocked car parked 
in a public parking lot and then left. R. 89:7. It is unknown where she went, but the 
record supports the conclusion she was gone for a period of at least forty-five minutes. R. 
89:16, 17, 30, 32. By being placed by defendant in her car, the shoes then became visible 
to anyone who may be passing and glanced into the car. Defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding the shoes at that point. Courts have held there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 121, 122 (1985) ("It is well-settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for law 
enforcement officials to seize "effects" that cannot support a justifiable expectation of 
privacy without a warrant, based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband."). 
If the court finds defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of her car, the City argues she abandoned that expectation when she left the stolen shoes 
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in her unsecured car in a public place. 
III. THE OFFICERS PROPERLY SEIZED THE STOLEN SHOES UNDER 
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement states an officer 
may search without a warrant a vehicle if there is probable cause the vehicle contains 
evidence or contraband and there are exigent circumstances. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 
95, 103 P.3d 699. The exception is based on a person's lesser expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle and the mobility of the vehicle itself. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 
(1985) ('The capacity to be 'quickly moved' was clearly the basis of the holding in 
Carroll and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal 
bases of the automobile exception."); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 
(1976) (stating the reasons for the automobile exception are twofold - the mobility of 
vehicles and the fact that driving a vehicle necessarily brings a person into contact with 
law enforcement under pervasive governmental regulation). 
Under Utah law the automobile exception requires a showing of probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. Brake at Tf25. Exigent circumstances are presumed when the 
vehicle is capable of mobility, the occupants are alerted to police interest, and the 
evidence could be destroyed while police obtain a warrant. See State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 
142 (Utah 1978). 
As argued above, officers had probable cause to believe defendant's car contained 
evidence of a crime. Additionally, there were exigent circumstances. All three Limb 
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factors were present. The court could reasonably infer that defendant's car was capable 
of mobility as she placed items in the car and left the keys in the ignition. R. 89:7, 14 
Furthermore, the court could reasonably infer that defendant was alerted to police 
presence as three officers responded to the scene; two were in uniform and one was in 
plain clothes; and two drove marked patrol vehicles and the other an unmarked white 
Crown Victoria. R. 89:17, 18, 31. The officers spent at least forty-five minutes at the 
scene and even tried to canvas the other businesses in the strip mall. R. 89:16, 17, 30, 32. 
Their presence at the scene was open to public view. Finally, the evidence in defendant's 
car could have been destroyed while the officers obtained a warrant. Defendant had not 
been identified and she left the car unlocked with the keys in the ignition which would 
have facilitated a quick "getaway" from the scene. 
Because probable cause and exigent circumstances were both present, Giles and 
Wallace properly seized the stolen shoes from defendant's car without first obtaining a 
warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments the Court should uphold the trial court's denial 
of defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of September, 2007. 
Michael G. Barker 
Orem City Prosecutor 
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